ឱកាសរបស់ចិននៅអ៊ុយក្រែន

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is in clear violation of principles that China has held sacrosanct for almost 60 years. There is no room for China to finesse that conclusion while remaining true to its core values.

NEW HAVEN – My recent commentary, “Only China Can Stop Russia,” stirred up strong arguments on both sides of the increasingly contentious debate over the horrific war in Ukraine. While most in the West recognize the need for extraordinary actions in extraordinary times and agree that China has an important role to play in resolving the conflict, those sympathetic to Russia’s concerns over border security and NATO enlargement argue that China has no reason to weigh in. But both posed the obvious and important follow-up question: What exactly can China do to restore peace and stability to Ukraine?

China can take the initiative in three key areas. For starters, Chinese President Xi Jinping should call for an emergency summit of G20 leaders, focused on achieving an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in this conflict and developing an agenda for a negotiated peace. The G20 is now the recognized forum for global action in the midst of crisis, having galvanized support among the world’s leading economies in late 2008 for a coordinated response to the global financial crisis. Both China and Russia are members, so the G20 can play a similar role today. As a demonstration of his personal commitment to this effort, Xi should break his post-pandemic lockdown protocol (he has not left China in 24 months) and attend the meeting in person – as should Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Second, China can contribute substantially to humanitarian assistance. With children comprising at least half of the more than two million refugees from Ukraine (a number projected to rise quickly to at least four million), the need for humanitarian support directed at neighboring host countries is unquestionably acute. China should make a no-strings-attached donation of $50 billion to UNICEF – the United Nations Children’s Fund – the world’s largest relief agency for children in distress.

Third, China can support Ukrainian reconstruction. Russia’s brutal bombing campaign has been aimed at pulverizing Ukrainian urban infrastructure. Ukraine’s government currently puts war-related infrastructure loss in the $10 billion range, a figure that could rise sharply in the days and weeks ahead. Rebuilding will be an urgent yet very burdensome task for a country that in 2020 ranked 120th in the world in terms of per capita GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis). China should use its peerless focus on modern infrastructure to provide dedicated post-conflict support to Ukraine totaling $3.5 billion – including but not limited to infrastructure-related activities of its Belt and Road Initiative (of which Ukraine has been a member since 2017) and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This is China’s Marshall Plan moment.

The plan I propose is far from perfect. But as Ukraine burns and its people, especially its children, suffer unfathomable hardship, it certainly beats the alternative of prolonging this tragic war. Yes, it may put China in an uncomfortable position. But leadership never comes easy. With Europe arguably on the brink of a war the likes of which it has not seen in 75 years, this is China’s moment to rise to the occasion. And make no mistake: this war is not just about Europe. Unlike World War II, this conflict has put two nuclear superpowers on a path of dangerous confrontation, with – as Putin himself put it – “consequences…such as you have never seen in your entire history.”

Only China can bring Putin to his senses. He has been unflinching in the face of brutal sanctions from the West. As a result, the Russian economy is on the brink of imploding. Without the support of Russia’s barely month-old “unlimited” partnership with China, that will happen sooner rather than later. China matters far more to Putin than any pain inflicted by Western sanctions.

Moreover, the potential collateral damage China faces from continuing to prioritize its partnership with Russia over its broader responsibilities for world peace is becoming increasingly apparent. As the West continues to up the ante on draconian sanctions against Russia, senior US officials are now openly discussing China’s guilt by association, just as I had warned. China needs to act quickly in order to forestall this possibility – before it finds itself in the crosshairs of rapidly spreading sanctions.

For a deeply principled nation, the choice is actually quite obvious. Since the days of Zhou Enlai in the mid-1950s, China has been steadfast in its commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, including respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, and non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is in clear violation of these sacrosanct principles. There is no room for China to finesse that conclusion while remaining true to its core values.

To be sure, as underscored in its recent partnership accord with Russia, China has expressed concerns over NATO expansion and Russia’s border security. Again, this is where China can take the lead in arguing these concerns in an emergency G20 forum. In assuming a leadership position, China will have ample opportunity to play the role of honest broker in weighing the risks and resolving this debate. But the war must end first.

Xi has been determined and methodical in charting a new path for China over the past ten years. At times his rhetoric has soared, steeped in aspirations of rejuvenation after a century of humiliation, great-power status for a “modern socialist nation” by 2049, and, more recently, “common prosperity” for the world’s largest population. Yet at some point, rhetoric starts to ring hollow. This crisis calls for more than slogans and promises: It is China’s opportunity to demonstrate that it is willing to step up and act on its long-sought goal of a responsible global leadership.

That may well raise tough questions for the rest of the world. But that’s our problem. After all, we in the West have not done a particularly good job in preventing this tragedy. The message bears repeating: Only China can stop Russia.

China's Moment of Decision

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently noted that his Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba, had expressed hope that China would help to mediate a ceasefire. If China is to play that role effectively, it must retain its credibility as an honest broker, including by avoiding any explicit condemnation of Russia’s actions.

CAMBRIDGE – China’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine has been heavily scrutinized and criticized. While Chinese officials have expressed concern about civilian casualties, they have declined to condemn the attack, which they regard as a response to NATO expansion, and they have declared that they will not join the West in imposing financial sanctions on Russia. Yet China has hardly given full-throated support to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The question is whether this relatively neutral stance by China could prove crucial to preventing further dangerous military escalation.

For most Western politicians, China’s response to the violence Putin has unleashed has been woefully inadequate. As White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki recently put it: “This is not a time to stand on the sidelines. This is a time to be vocal and condemn the actions of President Putin and Russia invading a sovereign country.” For US Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, China’s refusal to condemn the invasion indicates that it is “fine with the slaughter, the indiscriminate slaughter, of innocents in Ukraine.”

In reality, China’s stance is much more nuanced than these interpretations suggest. For starters, despite its claim to disagree with the sanctions the West has imposed on Russia, China has taken actions to comply with some of them by limiting the Chinese financing of certain transactions with Russia. And Chinese financial institutions are not prohibited from complying with Western sanctions. Moreover, China has repeatedly revised its position on Ukraine, gradually strengthening its disapproval of Russia’s actions. Behind the scenes, Chinese leaders discussed and debated policies to modify its relations with Russia.

One hopes that China has refused to side openly with the West against Russia in order to give itself some maneuvering room. Following a phone call, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that his Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba, had expressed hope that China would help to mediate a ceasefire. If China is to play such a role effectively, it must retain its credibility, including by avoiding an explicit condemnation of Putin’s actions, upholding economic relations, and keeping communication channels with Putin open.

In keeping with this role, China may in time adopt a tougher stance on Russia, in order to send a message to Putin, but it must calibrate its actions based on its risk assessment. With the ruble tanking, the Russian stock market on the precipice of collapse, and the military operation in Ukraine meeting stiff resistance, China may calculate that now is not the moment to pile on.

Putin’s complete isolation might sound good to the West. But it should be obvious that cornering a possibly unhinged authoritarian leader who has access to a huge nuclear arsenal creates an existential risk for the entire world. Indeed, Putin has announced that he has put Russia’s nuclear forces on “high alert.”

This is not a statement to take lightly, especially if Putin truly is non compos mentis. The principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD) amounts to an effective deterrent only if those with the authority to launch nuclear weapons behave rationally. The missile attack on the largest nuclear plant in Europe shows just how reckless Putin is. Even without a deliberate launch of nuclear weapons, a nuclear threat looms large.

Compounding the risk, Putin holds ultimate authority in today’s Russia. Even in the late Soviet Union, there was some diffusion of power. After Nikita Khrushchev’s ouster, Soviet leaders created the “triumvirate arrangement,” which distributed authority among Premier Alexei Kosygin, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and Chairman of the Presidium Anastas Mikoyan.

While the Soviet Union remained a totalitarian state, these leaders checked and balanced one another. This led to a more methodical approach to relations with the United States – and reinforced the efficacy of MAD. No such rationality is shaping Russian decision-making today. Confronting Russia thus demands every possible approach that may mitigate the threat Putin poses.

His assault on Ukraine is barbaric, and the world is right to be outraged. The Ukrainian people, who have shown great courage and made enormous sacrifices, deserve our deepest respect and full support. But a Putin with nothing to lose is the most dangerous Putin of all. To avoid a nuclear war, diplomats and world leaders must remain as emotionally detached and rational as possible.

At this strange and scary moment, the world needs a country that remains relatively neutral, maintains communication with the Kremlin, and has some leverage over Russia. That country is China.

A hopeful scenario is that China is maintaining a dialogue with Putin and that it will deploy a less moralistic approach to the conflict in Ukraine. China should apply quiet diplomacy where appropriate and economic leverage when necessary. But the window for action is closing. The war in Ukraine can easily spiral out of control, which will threaten the stability and economic prospects of China and world peace. Keeping a channel open to Russia can be a useful tactic, but the unwavering goal is to divert Russia from its reckless path of war.

China has adopted a foreign policy that aims to “build a community with a shared future for mankind.” Realizing that vision requires China to urge Putin to stop a war that jeopardizes the future for us all.

Will Putin's War Slow China's Growth?

The additional spike in food and energy prices caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict could be devastating for China. But the country’s neutral political stance toward the war may also yield economic gains.

CHICAGO – On March 5, China announced a GDP growth target for this year of about 5.5%, the lowest target since 1991. But that should not come as a surprise. In 2013, World Bank economists and the Chinese State Council projected that China’s annual growth rate would decline to 5% by 2030. This may still be an overestimate, given that growth rates during 2010-16 have been found to be inflated by 1.8 percentage points and that average growth in OECD economies is around 3%.

Back then, economists and policymakers also accurately predicted the main challenges to long-run growth in China, including increasing inequality, corruption, an aging population, inefficiency in large and often state-owned firms, and pollution. But no one could have foreseen the additional significant economic uncertainty stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and now Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The pandemic has severely disrupted supply chains and pushed up prices everywhere. China is particularly worried about rising food prices, because the country is a net importer of food, with the bill totaling $133 billion in 2019. Supply problems and bad weather caused the price of vegetables in Chinese cities to increase by 30.6% year on year in November 2021. The price of eggs, a major source of protein for the middle class, rose by 20.1% over the same period.

China’s other main concern is the cost of energy, because it is also a net importer of coal, natural gas, and crude oil. Increased demand from Chinese factories resuming production during the post-pandemic economic recovery contributed to further increases in the prices of energy commodities. Chinese regulators responded by increasing the cap on subsidized electricity prices. But this was insufficient to offset the losses to electricity generators as coal prices and domestic demand continued to rise. As a consequence, power plants in several northeastern provinces shut down in September 2021, leading to sudden mass power outages and a cascade of economic and social disruptions.

The Chinese government has since increased the price cap even more and boosted domestic production of coal, using its large reserves. But China’s reserves of other energy sources are limited, and demand for energy is likely to continue to rise.

These economic concerns, along with a desire to present a common front against the United States, help to explain China’s commitment to the “no limits” relationship with Russia that President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed in early February. Energy is the economic centerpiece of Sino-Russian relations. In 2019, fuel accounted for about 17%, or $344 billion, of China’s total imports of $2.1 trillion. Russia has been the biggest crude oil exporter to China since 2016, and is its fastest-growing supplier of natural gas. Twelve percent of all Chinese oil and gas imports now come from Russia.

To meet domestic energy demand and moderate its greenhouse-gas emissions, China plans to increase the share of natural gas in its primary energy consumption to 15% by 2030. Russia holds nearly a quarter of the world’s gas reserves and is the largest exporter. The two countries therefore agreed last month to a long-term contract under which Russian gas exports to China will increase to 48 billion cubic meters, or nearly 10% of China’s predicted gas consumption of 526 billion cubic meters, by 2025.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent Western-led economic and financial sanctions imposed on Russia, has suddenly cast a shadow of uncertainty over these plans. Besides exacerbating existing supply-chain disruptions, the wide-ranging sanctions have made it difficult for Chinese firms to operate in Russia. Most importantly, the war involves two of the largest global exporters of food and energy.

Ukraine and Russia together account for 28% of world grain exports, and wheat futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange have soared by more than 50% since the invasion. Similarly, oil, gas, and coal prices have surged due to supply disruptions and the sanctions against Russia. These inflationary pressures could have potentially devastating effects on the Chinese population, as well as on the country’s manufacturers.

But the Chinese government’s neutral political stance toward the Russia-Ukraine war may also yield economic payoffs if China becomes more important to Russia without overly offending major Western trading partners such as the US and Australia. Russian food exports in 2021 totaled $38 billion, of which $4.7 billion went to the European Union. So, Chinese food-price inflation could be moderated if EU sanctions cause Russia to divert some of its food exports to China on favorable terms.

Similarly, China is likely to gain more favorable terms for its energy imports as the war continues and other countries reduce their purchases of Russian oil and gas. The US has banned imports of Russian oil, and other countries are likely to follow suit. Likewise, the EU plans to reduce its reliance on Russian natural gas by two-thirds this year and seek alternative suppliers and energy sources to compensate.

While the switch away from gas will take time, it seems inevitable that Russia will need to look for other buyers soon. Given that oil and gas accounted for 60% of Russia’s exports and generated 39% of its federal budget revenue in 2019, China will be in a strong bargaining position.

Ultimately, the Russia-Ukraine war’s impact on the Chinese economy will depend on the duration of the conflict and the extent of the devastation that it causes in Ukraine and Russia, and other parts of the global economy. It will also depend on how much goodwill remains between China and Ukraine’s Western allies when the fighting stops.

Clearly, 2022 will be a year of uncertainty in which China has limited control over its rate of economic growth. New risks arising from the war in Eastern Europe have compounded the challenges that policymakers anticipated owing to the slow and uneven post-pandemic recovery. At this point, how China and the rest of the global economy will fare in the coming months is anyone’s guess.

Can Sanctions on Russia Work Without China?

As the conflict in Ukraine escalates, the growing calls to tighten the economic blockade against Russia are perhaps understandable. But China is likely to resist them, and further sanctions – especially in the energy sector – will not hurt Russia alone.

– Now that the Western powers have imposed sweeping economic and financial sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, many are asking whether China’s non-participation will undermine their effectiveness. One should also ask whether the rich countries can do more for the poor people in many developing countries who are the collateral damage of the war and the sanctions.

Based on data from 2019 (the last full year before the pandemic), China is Russia’s largest trading partner, accounting for about 14% of Russia’s exports and 19% of its imports. This seems to suggest that whether China participates in the sanctions could make a big difference. But two additional considerations qualify this conclusion significantly.

First, more than 60% of Russian exports to China are crude oil and refined petroleum, which – at least for now – are exempt from the European Union’s sanctions. So, a decision by China to join the sanctions regime would block less than 40% of Russia’s exports to the country, or less than 6% of total Russian exports.

Second, Russia’s trade with Europe as a whole is many times bigger than its trade with China. For example, Russia’s combined (pre-sanctions) exports to the Netherlands and Germany alone exceeded its exports to China. That, too, suggests one should not overestimate China’s potential contribution to the overall effectiveness of the sanctions regime.

Russia cannot easily divert its European exports to China. Its main exports, oil and gas, would face constraints in terms of both pipeline capacity and Chinese refining capacity. The ruble’s sharp depreciation could help to promote Russian non-energy exports to China, but China’s much stronger manufacturing base limits its need for such imports.

Advocates of even stricter sanctions also need to consider possible secondary economic consequences. If the West decided to target Russia’s energy sector, and China replaced its energy imports from Russia with imports from the Middle East or other regions, gas and electricity prices in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere would likely spike further.

While China may well decline to participate in Western sanctions against Russia for geopolitical reasons, economic considerations may also play an important role. As its pre-pandemic trade with Russia was three times bigger than that between the US and Russia and nearly seven times larger as that between the United Kingdom and Russia, the economic costs of comprehensive sanctions, including on energy, would be substantially higher for China (and Germany) than for either the US or the UK. These additional costs could jeopardize the Chinese government’s GDP growth target (about 5.5% in 2022) at a time when domestic demographic forces, tighter regulations, and geopolitical tensions with the West are already putting tremendous downward pressure on growth.

One way to encourage China to participate in the sanctions (and to persuade other countries such as Germany to stop importing Russian energy) is for the US to offer partial financial compensation to countries that would bear a disproportionate share of the resulting economic burden. But that does not seem politically feasible in America.

Another potential small nudge for China would be a United Nations General Assembly resolution explicitly calling for full-fledged economic sanctions against Russia. The General Assembly has adopted such resolutions in the past, and permanent members of the UN Security Council (including Russia and China) cannot veto them. In this regard, the recent US-drafted General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian invasion missed an opportunity by not including a recommendation that member countries impose economic sanctions on Russia. That would have placed the current Western sanctions under a UN banner.

True, large countries can still ignore UN resolutions. For example, every year, the General Assembly votes, often overwhelmingly, to demand that the US end its economic embargo against Cuba. The US ignores these votes, and no one else can do anything to change the situation.

Perhaps such UN resolutions are what led the US not to refer to economic sanctions in its recent resolution regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But other countries such as Canada or Australia could do so. Given China’s insistence that it supports a UN-centered world order, rather than a US-centered one, this could play at least some role in influencing ordinary Chinese.

The distributional consequences of full-blown sanctions could be significant, too. A maximum-pressure economic blockade that leads to regime change in Russia or otherwise stops the war in Ukraine is one thing. Sanctions that fail to achieve these objectives and yet destroy the livelihoods of ordinary Russians, many of whom oppose the war, are another thing entirely. Low-income Russians are likely less able to manage the burden of the sanctions than the oligarchs. By pushing up gas and utility costs, and the prices of other commodities, the sanctions would also impose hardship on people in many other developing countries who have yet to fully recover from the pandemic-induced income losses.

As the heartbreaking scenes in Ukraine continue to unfold, the growing calls to tighten the economic blockade against Russia are understandable. China’s non-participation will not make a huge difference in the end. But the adverse distributional consequences of both the war and the sanctions for poor people in developing countries are real. Rich countries should consider providing financial help to those people in developing countries who have less means to cope with the additional hardship.

The Monetary Consequences of Vladimir Putin

The sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine are financially and economically devastating, which is precisely their intent. Having witnessed this demonstration of financial shock and awe, will other countries re-think how and where they hold their foreign assets?

BERKELEY – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is radically redrawing the global economic, political, and security landscape. Politically, it is pushing Russia away from Europe. It has redoubled NATO members’ commitment to their alliance and led Germany to abandon its aversion to defense spending. Economically, it augurs an extended period of high energy prices as Europe weans itself from Russian oil and gas, in turn raising the specter of stagflation.

On the financial front, Russian banks have been barred from doing business in the West and have been cut off from SWIFT, the bank messaging system for international payments. The central bank’s securities and deposits have been frozen, rendering it incapable of stemming the ruble’s fall. It is similarly unable to act as a lender of last resort to financial institutions, such as Sberbank, with obligations in foreign currencies. These measures are financially and economically devastating, which is precisely their intent.

Having witnessed this demonstration of financial shock and awe, will other countries re-think how and where they hold their foreign assets? Will they seek a safe haven in China, which has not sanctioned Russia, and its currency, the renminbi?

Recent experience suggests not. Over the last couple of decades, the share of dollars in identified foreign-exchange reserves worldwide has fallen by roughly ten percentage points, as central banks diversified away from the greenback. But the resulting migration has been only one-quarter into the renminbi and fully three-quarters into “subsidiary” reserve currencies such as the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Swedish krona, and Swiss franc.

These currencies are easily traded. Combine them and they comprise a reasonably-sized aggregate. They provide reserve managers with diversification benefits, because they do not move in lockstep with the dollar. But all of their issuers, including even neutral Switzerland, are supporting the anti-Russia sanctions, which means that none of these currencies is likely to provide a haven for governments violating international norms.

Why hasn’t there been more migration toward the renminbi? Part of the answer is that renminbi-denominated bonds and bank deposits are not easily accessed by foreign official investors, at least in the relevant quantities. Dim sum bonds (renminbi-denominated bonds traded offshore, in Hong Kong and elsewhere) and offshore renminbi bank deposits are accessible, but other instruments not so much. Although Hong Kong and Shanghai operate a Bond Connect through which overseas investors can invest in Mainland China’s interbank bond market, few if any central banks are on the list of approved investors authorized to participate in the scheme.

Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions are sure to remind central banks’ reserve managers of a fundamental fact: every leading international and reserve currency in history has been the currency of a political democracy or republic, where there are credible institutional limits on arbitrary action by the executive. Under President Xi Jinping, China has of course been moving in the opposite direction – away from such limits. The collective rule of former Chinese presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin has given way to a personalistic regime very similar to Putin’s. Few reserve managers will be inclined to place their asset portfolios at Xi’s mercy.

In any case, by definition, China, the single largest reserve holder, cannot hold its own currency as foreign reserves.

So how will the international monetary system be affected by sanctions against Russia? To answer this question, it is important to bear in mind that countries hold reserves for two reasons: to intervene in the currency market to mitigate unwelcome fluctuations, and as a war chest to be tapped in a geopolitical conflict or other emergency.

In practice, the same pool of reserves can be used for both purposes: for market operations in normal times and for emergency purchases in a crisis. One is reminded how the Allied Powers used their gold and foreign-exchange reserves for currency-market intervention in the 1930s and then to purchase war materiel from the United States following the outbreak of World War II.

Russia’s recent experience suggests that a war chest of gold and foreign-exchange reserves may not be as useful as previously supposed. The inability of Afghanistan’s new Taliban-led government to access its dollar reserves in New York points in the same direction.

Less utility in a conflict therefore means that countries contemplating being on the outs with the US and the Western alliance may be inclined to hold fewer reserves. This adjustment would mean that there might also be circumstances where they have less capacity to intervene in the currency market and will have to accept wider exchange-rate fluctuations.

Sensible governments respond to this eventuality by hardening their financial systems against currency risk. They prevent their banks and corporations from incurring excessive foreign-currency liabilities. Prior to launching its war, Russia had moved in this direction, but insufficiently so, presumably because Putin failed to anticipate the West’s massive financial sanctions. Other governments are unlikely to make the same mistake in the future.

Putin and Xi's Imperium of Grievance

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is no longer any doubt that the halcyon days of Western-led globalization are over, not just economically but also politically and culturally. The narrative of victimization that fuels Russian and Chinese nationalism will continue to prevail over the niceties of the post-Cold War era.

– Soon after the news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine flashed across my computer screen, I received an email that seemed to mark another milestone in the dismantling of the old global order. Having tickets to attend a Vienna Philharmonic concert at New York’s Carnegie Hall, I received a “Customer Service Announcement” reporting that the Valery Gergiev – described as “a friend and prominent supporter of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia” – would no longer be conducting the orchestra. Many other orchestras have since cut ties with Gergiev as well.

Until the Russian invasion, it was still possible to believe that a full Western “decoupling” from China and Russia was both unlikely and unwise. Yet Gergiev’s removal is a metaphor for how the newly confected Sino-Russian axis is catalyzing a rift that will now affect everything from cultural exchanges to trade.

After all, until the invasion, many were skeptical that the European Union (especially Germany) would ever get the Russian natural-gas needle out of its arm – especially with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline offering up a fresh vein. Equally, many have wondered how the US could ever kick its addiction to low-cost Chinese-made merchandise now that so many of its own factories have closed.

During the halcyon days of globalization – when “Davos man” ruled the planet with cheery bromides about win-win-win outcomes – global supply chains seemed to promise boundless benefits for everyone. What was wrong with outsourcing to distant lands if they could make something cheaper and ship it faster? Open markets were touted for their ability to create more open societies. All we had to do was keep trading transnationally, paying no heed to the ideological or political cast of the other country. Thus did the West, and much of the rest of the world, become codependent with Russia (for gas) and China (for rare earths, polysilicon, pharmaceuticals, and old-fashioned consumer goods).

But with Putin invading Ukraine and Chinese President Xi Jinping expressing revanchist attitudes toward Taiwan, we are left to assess not only an upturned world order and a shattered global marketplace, but also the sundering of anodyne cultural exchanges.

What is driving this unexpected and dangerous train wreck? Why would Putin throw Russia’s real national interests to the wind by invading a once-fraternal neighbor? What would lead Xi to countenance sacrificing his own people’s historic economic miracle for the sake of seizing a flea-shaped island that China hasn’t ruled in well over a century? Why have these two latter-day authoritarians indulged such self-destructive urges and alienated so many other important countries, just when the world was becoming so interdependent?

First, it is important to remember that autocrats are far freer to act in unrestrained ways, because they face few if any political checks and balances. Thus, as “supreme” leaders, they can shape policies according to their own characterological disorder without challenges. While Putin and Xi have very different backgrounds and personalities, they share some key traits. Both are deeply insecure, paranoid men who have been shaped by historical narratives of grievance, especially against the “great powers” of the West.

These narratives center around Leninist themes of foreign exploitation, humiliation, and victimization. They demonize Western democracies as hypocrites and oppressors (as in Lenin’s theory of imperialism). And they impute arrogant and disdainful attitudes to the West.

More than anything else, Putin and Xi want respect. Yet they know that most Western leaders do not, and probably never will, respect their authoritarianism – no matter how successful they are in building high-speed rail lines, constructing modern cities, or hosting Olympic Games. It is this respect-deficit syndrome that has created their imperium of resentment and grievance. Putin and Xi recognize that they will never overcome this, regardless of how successfully their foreign, technology, and space policies advance their countries’ development, or how much oil and gas they sell to the world. And it does no good to admonish them that gaining respect requires them to behave respectably, rather than jailing opposition candidates and dissidents (including Nobel laureates), persecuting people for their religious beliefs, bullying other countries with punitive trade policies, and launching invasions. Having drunk the Leninist Kool-Aid of victimization, Putin and Xi simultaneously want to overthrow the Western order and be esteemed by it.

As such, they are animated by a contradiction that no amount of Western handholding can resolve. Not even the tonic effect of “engagement,” sustained through nine US presidential administrations, was enough to overcome China’s sense of being the target of constant disapprobation and ideological threat (in the form of “peaceful evolution” and “color revolutions”) from the world’s democracies. Putin and Xi take great umbrage at having to live next door to successful democracies, like Ukraine and Taiwan, comprised of peoples with similar histories, cultures, and ethnicities.

The magnetic force of shared grievance has brought these two former rivals so close that they recently declared there were “no limits” to their partnership. Both insist that it should be up to the people of the country “to decide whether their state is a democratic one.” And Putin and Xi claim they are leading a new kind of democracy, never mind that Putin fancies himself a czar, and that Xi’s version of governance is a “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat.”

The question now is whether Russia and China will be able to maintain their opportunistic pact following Putin’s decision to go to war. Just before the invasion, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the Munich Security Conference that the “sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” of all countries should be protected, and that “Ukraine is no exception.” And Xi subsequently called Putin to explain that, while he understands Russia’s security concerns, China still respects the sovereignty of nation-states and intends to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter. After all, the Communist Party of China does not want foreign powers interfering in its own “internal affairs,” never mind invading China.

Which of these imperatives will win out? Most likely, China and Russia’s shared aversion to liberal democracy (and to the self-righteousness of democratic leaders) will ultimately trump the quaint nineteenth-century idea that national sovereignty is sacred. The narrative of victimization that is psychologically fueling both countries’ nationalism with reservoirs of resentment is simply too powerful to be nullified by the niceties of international law.

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